We need people to study the Iraqi constitution and Bremer Law especially the parts relating to the military
The current basis for the organization and discipline of the Iraqi military originates from Bremer Orders Number 22 and 23 issued in 2003.
At a lunch with President Bush, Bremer made the argument that
the plan would violate the principle of unity of command and lead to
confusion. Bush agreed and decided to send Bremer alone to lead the
Coalition Provisional Authority and to give him supreme authority over all
US actions in Iraq; Bremer was, in effect, the US Viceroy in Iraq. President
Bush’s important decision was made without consulting his Secretary of
State or National Security Adviser.
According to Colin Powell, ‘The plan
was for Zal to go back. He was the one guy who knew this place better than
anyone. I thought this was part of the deal with Bremer. But with no
discussion, no debate, things changed. I was stunned’. Powell observed that
President Bush’s decision was ‘typical’. There were ‘no full deliberations.
And you suddenly discover, gee, maybe that wasn’t so great, we should have
thought about it a little longer’.
Further, these decisions were made in the face of CIA intelligence
judgments that in the aftermath of an initial US military victory, that
significant ethnic political conflict was likely to occur. The former chief of
the CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Richard Kerr, headed a team to analyze
the CIA’s intelligence performance before the war in Iraq. Kerr concluded
that the CIA ‘accurately forecast the reactions of the ethnic and tribal
factions in Iraq. Indeed, intelligence assessments on post-Saddam issues were
particularly insightful. These and many other topics were thoroughly
examined in a variety of intelligence products that have proven to be largely
accurate’.
Kerr concluded that policy makers, though relying heavily on the
inaccurate judgments about WMD, largely ignored the accurate CIA
Roger Cohen, ‘The MacArthur lunch’,
New York Times
, 27 August 2007,
See also Richard Betts,
Enemies of Intelligence
(New York: Columbia University Press 2007)
pp.14–6.
US Blunders in Iraq, predictions of the effect of war on post-Saddam Iraq. Had the accurate CIA
intelligence judgments about the effects of Saddam’s fall been heeded by
policy makers, they might have been more hesitant to de-Baathify the
government and disband the Army.
Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1: De-Baathification
The decision by Bush to put Bremer fully in charge led to the first of
the two blunders. In his de-Bathification order (Coalition Provisional
Authority Order Number 1 of 16 May 2003), Bremer ordered that all
senior party members would be banned from serving in the government
and the top three layers of officials of all government ministries were
removed, even if they were not senior members of the Baath Party. This
included up to 85,000 people who, in Bremer’s eyes, were ‘true believers’
and adherents to Saddam’s regime.
While Garner had planned a gradual
approach to de-Baathification, Bremer’s approach was more far-reaching
and draconian.
Bremer argued that the decision to ban Baathists from participating in a
new Iraqi government was made by President Bush. In a sense, he was
correct. The plans for de-Baathification were presented to Bush at 10 March
2003 NSC meeting by Douglas Feith.
There was broad consensus that top
level Saddam allies in the party had to be purged in order to show Iraqis that
Saddam’s influence was gone. The Office of Special Plans in Douglas Feith’s
office worked on the plans with Ahmed Chalabi and favored a deep de-
Baathification of the Iraq government.
Bremer said that on 9 May Feith showed him a draft of an order for the
‘De-Baathification of Iraqi Society,’ and later that day he received his
‘marching orders’ in a final memo from Rumsfeld.
Feith said that the
decision had been ‘worked and reworked in interagency meetings, and by
early May it had interagency clearance’.
Once in Iraq, Bremer said that
‘The White House, DoD, and State all signed off on this’.
Despite Feith’s
assertion that the decision had been cleared in an inter-agency process, the
military had a distinctly different understanding of the policy and the CIA
was not consulted.
The military interpretation of the purge was that it would apply to the
top two levels of the Baath party, those who were clearly leaders,
VERY INTERESTINGhttp://pfiffner.gmu.edu/files/pdfs/Arti ... %20PDF.pdfThere is a great deal of reading/studying to be done we need volunteers