Kurdistan independence related articles & photos

[brendar]

http://kiitsc.com/ar/contact.php

[alan131210]

^^ oh hell yes i want one , ill get one when i go back in the coming Newroz.

[zaxo10]

http://kiitsc.com/ar/contact.php

Is the card for real???

[brendar]

Is the card for real???

It looks like!

[diako_ber]

I thought I'd post this here:

21/08/2012 15:40
 
ERBIL, Aug.21 (AKnews)- The US government has not demanded the oil companies not to invest in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, said Kurdistan Natural Resourced Minister.

Ashti Hawrami made the remarks in response to some media reports which quoted the US State Department Spokesperson Victoria Nuland saying Washington has warned the oil companies not to sign any oil deals with Kurdistan without Baghdad's approval or Baghdad may take legal action against them.

The US Exxon Mobil and Chevron companies as well as the French Total are the major oil giants operating in Kurdistan oil fields and have shares in fields across the Iraqi provinces. 

Hawrami described the media reports quoting Nuland  "baseless ….These are not but propaganda… by some people who yearn for the US to make such a word.

"The US has never made such a statement and has not told us, as the [Kurdistan] Regional Government, anything." 

The minister said the region is ready to export oil after the Eid al-Fitr, the deadline for Baghdad to pay the suspended dues of foreign oil companies.

He warned if Baghdad fails again to pay the dues "the region will make its own decision."

Under a political agreement Baghdad has undertaken to reimburse the investing oil companies in the region. Suspending the dues of such companies for more than 10 months pushed the Kurdistan Ministry of Natural Resources suspend all its oil exports (175,000 barrels per day) early May.

By Rebin Hassan
LL/AKnews

[alan131210]

Since it's oil related should have been posted there or wait its already posted

[alan131210]

By Adam Garfinkle - Via Meadia

http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/mi ... te6442.htm

[alan131210]

[12:20] 12/Aug/28

PNA – The former speech writer to more than one U.S Secretary of State and the editor of The American Interest Adam Garfinkle has analyzed in his recent publication the situation of Kurds by assessing the historic records of the nation itself and its neighbors (namely Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria) and their role on the creation of a Kurdish identity. The past compared in detail with the current situation of the region, nation’s own important role and international situation, which he believes is backing Kurds to reach their long-term national dream, an independent Kurdistan.

“The Kurds never thought of themselves as a separate nation until very recently, certainly not before the 20th century”, Garfinkle said.

He explained that the creation of national identity first emerged among Turks, Arabs and others in the region and finally among Kurds certainly after the fall of Ottoman Empire.

Regarding the role of Kurds before the fall of Empire, the writer says “while Kurds often played important roles in the great parade of Muslim empires, they did not do so self-consciously as Kurds, but rather as Muslims”, has given Salahadin Ayoubi as an example.

In addition to the regional arrangement and its influence on Kurds, the nation themselves according to the writer’s perspective lacked an extensive written literature before the 20th century and Kurds focused their collective identity largely on the tribal values rather than national affiliation. The geographic location of greater Kurdistan with huge mountain in-between makes the situation for Kurds even more difficult to overcome these problems.

Things however changed sharply, the creation of Turkish, Arab, Persian identity followed by a creation of Kurdish identity; Kurdish national awareness, the strength of its national literature and understanding of national politics raised as a consequence of technological development; as a result Kurds are less divided today than ever and Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq became a guidance for other parts of Kurdistan.

International alliance and super power’s attitude towards Kurdish independence is one of the most important point of Garfinkle’s discussion. The writer states that while Kurdish independence used to be a threat to the national interest of the United States, and U.S ‘s attitude on the issue was one of the obstacles on the road of Kurdish independence, today those reasons gone forever.

The following paragraph is in writer’s words, explaining the current U.S interest and Kurdish independence:

“The United States used to be against Kurdish independence, period and full stop. But the reasons for this opposition no longer claim much power. American administrations opposed it in part because Kurdish independence was a short-term ploy of the Soviet government after World War II, designed to hurt two American associates at the time, Iran and Turkey. Somehow it stuck in our heads that Kurdish independence was a bad thing even after the Soviet opportunity to use the Kurds to advantage had long since disappeared. But there were other reasons, too. We did not think it was a good idea in general to mess with the national boundaries of the area, artificial and prone to mousetrap/ping-pong ball collapse as they are. In particular, as a subset of this general concern with shaky boundaries, successive U.S. administrations supported the continuation of Iraq as a unitary state.

None of these reasons make a lot of sense anymore. Iraq is no longer a unitary state, thanks in large part to what we did to it. Other borders have been tampered with lately, Sudan and Mali being the two most recent cases in point, and the great crescendo of clattering of mousetraps has not been heard as a result. (Not that the results have been pretty.) And the Turks now seem for the first time at least theoretically reconcilable to the idea of an independent Kurdish state, so long as they think they can more or less control the dangers it might pose to them.”

At the end of his article, Adam Garfinkle however realistically points out some other regional obstacles that remain on the road of achieving a greater Kurdistan, but not necessarily on KRG’s attempts to announce its own Kurdish government.

Adam M. Garfinkle is the editor of The American Interest, a bimonthly public policy magazine. He was previously editor of another such publication, The National Interest. He has been a university teacher and a staff member at high levels of the U.S. government. Garfinkle was a speechwriter for George W. Bush's Secretaries of State, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. He was editor of The National Interest and left to edit The American Interest magazine in 2005. Francis Fukuyama, Eliot Cohen, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Josef Joffe, and Ruth Wedgwood were among the magazine's founding leadership.

[jjmuneer]

Kurdistan conflict threatens to bring new violence to Iraq


http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/14/iraq-kurdistan-maliki-barzani?newsfeed=true

Just how far will the dispute between Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan go? Clashes between the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, and the Kurdish president, Massoud Barzani, have been escalating since the US withdrawal at the end of 2011, leading to speculation about the declaration of an independent Kurdish state. Certainly the hypothesis of an armed conflict between the central Iraqi government and the autonomous Kurdish region cannot be excluded.

One recent example of current tensions occurred last month when the Kurdish peshmerga prevented the Iraqi national army from reaching the Fishkhabur crossing into Syria in the Zimar region, one of the "disputed territories". According to AFP, an anonymous Iraqi source has accused the Kurdish authorities of illegally buying anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons "with help from a foreign country". Fingers point to Turkey, which supports Iraqi Kurdistan and is in conflict with Baghdad. Last spring Barzani tried in vain to dissuade the US from selling F16 fighter planes to Iraq.

This tension has been exacerbated by the war in Syria. Barzani supports the rebels whereas Maliki, who is pro-Iran supports Bashar al-Assad. Profiting from this situation, the Iraqi branch of al-Qaida has resurfaced and on 23 July claimed responsibility for a series of attacks that killed 116 people.

Baghdad and Erbil have an endless list of grievances, ranging from border controls and the integration of the peshmerga to the Iraqi national army, to the delimitation of Kurdistan and the sharing of wealth between the centre and the autonomous region – especially oil.

There is a fear that growing Kurdish independence will serve as an example to the Sunni provinces, or even to the oil-rich Shia province of Basra in the far south of Iraq, which produces 2m of the 2.5m Iraqi barrels a day. "Al-Maliki would far rather be the leader of a large country than the master of a 'Shia-istan' in the south of Iraq," was one western diplomat's analysis. Conversely, Barzani sees himself as the defender of Iraqi minorities in the face of Shia "hegemony". That is why he granted asylum to the Sunni vice-president Tariq al-Hashemi in December 2011, after he was judged in abstentia in Iraq for having headed a death squad during the civil war (2005-2008).

The Kurdish-Sunni rapprochement, promoted by Turkey, has led to a coalition that is seeking to overthrow Maliki – so far without success. In retaliation, the Iraqi prime minister denounced his opponent's corruption and nepotism on a private Kurdish television station last June, pointing out that Barzani's son heads the autonomous region's security services while his nephew is prime minister.

At the core of this friction lies the issue of Iraqi Kurdistan's independence. According to one diplomat, Barzani's dilemma is as follows: "He knows that Kurdistan is not ready and that other countries in the region would not appreciate a declaration of independence. But he is also aware that the longer he waits, the stronger Baghdad will become."

This article originally appeared in Le Monde

[alan131210]

Failing Federalism in Iraq and the Kurdish Quest for Independence


By Rauf Naqishbendi — Ekurd.net

August 31, 2012

As a legal term, “sovereign state” is defined as: The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which an independent state is governed and from which all specific political powers are derived; the intentional independence of a state, combined with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign interference.

Sovereignty is the power of a state to do everything necessary to govern itself, such as making, executing, and applying laws; imposing and collecting taxes; making war and peace; and forming treaties or engaging in commerce with foreign nations.

National security and civil society can be furnished only through a strong central government that has monopoly of the power. Power that is divided between a federal government and any of its subordinated regions is an open invitation to civil disturbances threatening the fabric of civil society and national security.

Matters essential to the life of the nation such as defense, foreign policy issues, controlling natural resources, printing money, declaring war, post office, establishing army and navy, and commerce with other nations are powers exclusively reserved to the federal government. Should the control of these matters be shared with any other groups within the country, it assuredly will weaken the central government, disfiguring economic, social, and political conditions.

In a federalist system, federated states are bound by the national constitution where deviation from federal constitution is disallowed within the individual states, yet they are empowered to institute their own constitution in matters deemed appropriate to their local jurisdiction, such as budgeting, taxation, education, minimum wage, occupational health and safety, managing state properties, and law enforcement institution.
From what has preceded, the Iraqi government will be brought to light, and the workability of power sharing between central Iraqi government and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

Since its independence from Great Britain in 1932, Iraq has been ruled by the Hāshimite monarchy and thereafter by dictators who seized power through military coups. Since the onset of its formation as a country, minority Sunni Muslims have been the dominant power, until the American invasion of Iraq, after which the majority Shiites held the power.

Iraq’s government, throughout its history, has adhered to the principle of the central government’s authority to disallow power sharing amongst the threads, making the fabric of Iraq’s homogenous population. America’s invasion of Iraq introduced federalism, under which the Kurds were granted unprecedented power to govern their region economically, militarily, and legislatively. This arrangement imposed by America wasn’t designed to appease the Kurds or alienate Arab nationalists, but rather it was because of the lack of a strong Iraqi central government and the tumultuous Iraqi situation with the torrent of terrorist violence pouring into south and central Iraq, which left Kurds in charge of the situation.

Then the American troops departed Iraq. The Arab-fashioned leadership is now at work to consolidate its power and solidify its armed forces, targeting restoration of a strong sovereign government, which means an authoritarian government that will reveal its ugly smite upon Kurdish leaders, implying that, as a minority in Iraq, they wouldn’t be trusted to act or behave in any manner like the sovereign state, thereby defying Baghdad’s authority.

The Kurdish leadership miscalculated federalism, first on the onset of American invasion of Iraq. They were duped to trust America, not knowing the arrangement America imposed to empower Kurds was transitory and would last only for the duration of American presence in Iraq. Second, they thought that while the chaotic situation in Iraq persists, thereby the Iraqi government would remain weak. But the current waves of reality have proved against them: America left Iraq, and then the Iraqi government got stronger as terrorist activities subsided.

Kurdish leaders engaged in signing contracts with foreign companies regarding oil drilling in Kurdistan, in consternation and defiance of the Iraqi government. Furthermore, they engaged in foreign policy arrangements as if the KRG was a sovereign state. These actions are all contradictory to the common definition of sovereign governments. The idea of one government with mighty power to rule the entire country, rather than a government within the government is Al-Maliki’s aim.

The current federalism is not workable because the federal government is malfunctioning in a divided country. Moreover, it is impossible to teach Arabs power sharing, which has no precedent in their history. Sure, the Kurds deserve their God-given right to be nationally recognized through their independent homeland. However, that right is not bestowed but to be earned. Kurdish leaders miscalculated America’s intention, assuming that America would perpetuate its protection of the Kurds, but America has not made such a commitment. If the Kurdish leadership were wise, they would have turned to the American invasion of Iraq to accomplish the Kurdish dream for independence. Instead, they let themselves be used by America. Suffice to say Kurdish leaders did more for the Arabs than the Kurds.

Power sharing is workable when participating powers are genuine and harmonious with one another and when there is a binding agreement that serves as a guiding principle, guarding the balance of power. Unfortunately, the federalism will fall apart for lack of a binding principle between Kurdish leaders and the Iraqi government, the Arabs’ unwillingness to share power, and the Kurdish leaders’ desire to act as leaders of the sovereign nations. Eventually, Kurdish leaders will be pressured to ease their demand, and their refusal may lead to an armed conflict. This will be the worst for the Kurds, for they will not be able to defend themselves in the face of Iraq’s military armed with sophisticated American war machinery.

It must be realized that the Arabs are not only rebuking the Kurdish independent state but, as well, an autonomous Kurdistan region within federated Iraq. It’s not only the Iraqi Arabs that the Kurds have become content with, but rather the entire Arab world that is united and has agreed upon the Kurds’ subjugation to Arab power.

In the final analysis the ultimate solution for the Kurds to live free, breathe free, and feel free is to be free from Arab domination. That simply means an independent Kurdistan, Kurds’ national right, and Kurds must pursue.

Rauf Naqishbendi is a contributing columnist for Kurdishaspect.com, American Chronicle, Kurdishmedia.com and Ekurd.net, and has written Op/Ed pages for the Los Angeles Times. His memoirs entitled "The Garden Of The Poets", recently published. It reads as a novel depicting his experience and the subsequent 1988 bombing of his hometown with chemical and biological weapons by Saddam Hussein. It is the story of his people´s suffering, and a sneak preview of their culture and history. Rauf Naqishbendi is a software engineer in the San Francisco Bay Area.

[alan131210]

Arnold looking at the map of "greater Kurdistan"

[Kurdistano]

Arnold looking at the map of "greater Kurdistan"

I bet its fake why should Arnold do that and more suspicious why should the former Prime Minister of Russia present it to him in a way as if its a picture of his own collection?

[alan131210]

does not look fake.

[alan131210]

This is part two of a three-part series on Kurdish efforts toward statehood, and that potential state's future relations with Israel. If you have not done so already, we recommend first reading Quest for an Independent (Israel-friendly?) Kurdistan - Part I

Dr. Michael Eppel, an expert specializing in the Kurdish history at the University of Haifa, believes that the creation of semi-autonomous Kurdish regions that merge into one body is a likely eventuality.

“The Kurds are currently facing a lot of problems, bogging down their dream of a unified state,” he explained. “First of all, they are divided. Although they all share the yearning for independence, I am not sure that each of the groups knows what exactly that means and how to cooperate on the matter,” Eppel told the magazine.

Indeed, with 15 political parties in Syria alone, many of which are very small and relatively inactive, it’s difficult to imagine how Kurds could establish a central government. In July, Massoud Barzani, the President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, who heads the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), made an effort to unite the leading parties of the Syrian Kurds. His move, however, sparked criticism among those who argued that he was more interested in boosting his own popularity rather than overcoming differences.

“Another problem is that there is no territorial continuity between various Kurdish settlements in Syria,” said Eppel, stressing that while the three parts of Greater Kurdistan are connected, the settlements of Kurds inside Syria are not.

Abbas disagrees with Eppel's assessment but concedes that Kurdish ambitions of self-determination are impeded by the hostile attitude of Turkey, which views Kurdish sovereignty as a threat to Turkey's national security. After Kurds took control over several districts in northern Syrian, enlarging their border with Turkey from the previous 800km to 1200km, Ankara became extremely uneasy and began beefing up its military presence on the Turkish border.

“The creation of a Kurdish state is a nightmare for Turkey,” explained Eppel. “First of all, Ankara is concerned that the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) – considered a terrorist organization by the Turkish authorities – would use the seized territories to launch additional attacks on Turkey. Secondly, the creation of a Kurdish region inside Syria could inspire similar developments inside Turkey, dealing a blow to the country’s nationalism,” added the pundit.

Such considerations have fueled fears that Turkey might use the PKK as an excuse to invade Syria, leaving the Kurds defenseless in face of a strong enemy. “The PKK doesn’t enjoy the support of the US, nor do they operate in mountainous areas that would protect them against the Turkish army,” argued Abbas.

Nevertheless, economic and political considerations seem to have dissuaded Ankara from invading the Kurdish area of Syria. Instead, Turkey may be unwittingly helping the Kurds to fulfill their dream of a Greater Kurdistan, by establishing tight economic ties with the KRG. There are at least 900 Turkish companies currently operating on the territory of northern Iraq, and Turks own an estimated 50% of all major businesses in the area. More than seven percent of Turkish exports have gone to the KRG.

Apart from trade, there is also close Turkish-Kurdish cooperation on energy projects, with the two governments agreeing to build two oil and gas pipelines, expected to be completed by 2014. “It’s a win-win situation. Being landlocked and having no access to ports, Kurds need Ankara – used as an energy hub – to transfer their oil to the international markets. Energy-starved Turkey, on the other hand, needs the Kurds to boost its economy and minimize dependency on Russia,” explained Eppel.

There are also common political interests promoting greater Kurdish-Turkish cooperation. Iraq’s central government is heavily influenced by Iran, Turkey’s main regional rival. United by a common religion – Shia Islam – Iraq and Iran have a common interest in maintaining the status quo in Syria, which undermines the Turkish ambition of establishing its control over the Levant and becoming the leader of the Sunni Muslim world.

That’s why, when it comes to Syria, Ankara prefers to back the Gulf states' plan to topple the current regime and establish a caliphate that has no place for Kurds. To get the support of the Kurdish street, Syria’s National Council – one of the main opposition groups in Syria that’s believed to be heavily influenced by both Ankara and the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar-funded Islamist organization, appointed an independent Kurdish activist Abdul Baset Sieda as its leader and even issued a national charter to "redress the injustice … the Kurdish people have faced for decades …"

Yet the SNC policy towards minorities remains unaltered. In May, the group’s former leader, Burhan Ghalioun, rejected the existence of any region called “Kurdistan” within Syria and encouraged Kurds to abandon the illusion of federalism. The SNC also fiercely opposed changing the name of the post-Assad Syria from the current "Syrian Arab Republic" to the "Syrian Republic."

http://israeltoday.co.il/NewsItem/tabid ... fault.aspx

[alan131210]

Millions of Kurds, observing the meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Tehran last week, must have thought: "What about us? What about our non-aligned nation to be? We should be there. Maybe next time..."

It may be just possible that Kurds - which themselves admit their notoriety for internal squabble - are finally getting their act together; after all, history may be dictating, roughly a century after World War I and its aftermath, which dealt a big blow to Kurds. This is the last chance for the emergence of a Greater Kurdistan.

After the two Syrian Kurdish parties made a deal - sealed by Iraqi Kurdistan President Masoud Barzani - to jointly run northeast Syria, Kurdish parties in Iran are also coming together.

Meanwhile, Ankara behaves like a bunch of headless chickens.

Kurds are carefully paying attention to how Ankara decided to boycott NAM - even though Turkish President Abdullah Gul was personally invited by Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Egypt's President Mohammed Morsi proposed a Syria contact group - Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran - to try to solve the Syrian tragedy.

This means that Egypt - under a Muslim Brotherhood president - privileges mediation for a civil war inside a fellow Arab country, while Turkey sticks to a colour-blind regime change strategy, which would only be possible with a NATO no-fly zone (it won't happen).

So the pressing question for the Kurds becomes how to profit from Ankara's each and every move.

And the winner is... Israel

Not even Turkish public opinion knows what exactly are the contours of Ankara's policy for Syria - apart from regime change. President Gul claims that Damascus weaponises PKK guerrillas (there's absolutely no evidence), and that would be a casus belli.

Damascus for its part does not want a war with Turkey.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu - he of the defunct "zero problems with our neighbours" doctrine - is still toeing the line that the country could not accept more than 100,000 Syrian refugees (there are already 70,000 and counting); in this case, some fuzzy "safe haven" would have to be installed in Syrian territory. This Thursday, Ankara will press the complexities of the refugee crisis at a ministerial-level meeting at the UN.

Ankara has insistently accused both Damascus and Tehran of supporting PKK guerrillas active in Anatolia and the porous border areas. Yet at the same time, Ankara has developed a quite secretive narrative; Turkey, once again, is aligned with Israel's strategy (the Mavi Marmara incident is now water under the bridge).
Talk to Al Jazeera -
Massoud Barzani: Flying the Kurdish flag

Tel Aviv avidly bets on Ankara becoming the hegemonic regional power in the - still hazy - event of a post-Assad Syria. As Israel has been deeply infiltrated in Iraqi Kurdistan for years, with very good connections - the Mossad uses it as an operational base against Syria and Iran - this will be manipulated as a bargaining chip to seduce Ankara.

Meanwhile, in Syria, the red, green and yellow Kurdish flag is now flying in places like Girke Lege - only 35 kilometres from the Iraqi border and only 15 kilometres from the Turkish border. Over 3 million Syrian Kurds now see an ideal opening to revert the official Ba'ath Party Arabisation policy.

The Kurdish PYD (Democratic Union Party) President Salah Muslim vehemently denies that there was a tacit agreement with the Bashar al-Assad government. But in fact there was; as long as Syrian Kurds don't attack Damascus forces, they can do whatever they want in Western/Syrian Kurdistan, which by now is assuming the contours of a an autonomous region.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, by the way, has already delivered the message to Ankara; even in a post-Assad Syria, this should be seen as a fact on the ground. And it happens to dovetail with Israel's charm offensive among Kurds - emphasising what would be their common agenda.

So what can Ankara do? Invade? Kurdish blowback is bound to be devastating.

Despite official rumblings, Turkish options for invading Western/Syrian Kurdistan are not exactly stellar. The Turkish army's morale is low - after the purge of several ranking Kemalists. Over 60 generals are in jail, accused of plotting a coup - and lower-ranking officials may even try it again. Alevis and Kurdish conscripts will refuse to fight an AKP-incited war. And the Turkish economy - not to mention tourism - will inevitably go down the drain.

Is there a leader in the house?

One can imagine whether Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Barzani's political scheming will be enough for him to embrace the Angel of History, and rise to the occasion.

He certainly sees a Greater Kurdistan independent from Arabs, Persians and Turks. But for that to happen in a grand scale he would have to conduct himself as a unifier - not only sharing power inside Iraqi Kurdistan but also managing conflicting Kurdish aspirations in Syria, Iran and Turkey. This implies a visionary streak plus tremendous diplomatic skills.

What's certain is that Washington and Tel Aviv are on board; this implies that Brussels sooner or later will follow. BRICS members Russia and China are not exactly against it. There are two possibilities here. A Greater Kurdistan forged as a model for the Middle East - in terms of a secular, dynamic, progressive entity respectful of religious minorities. Or yet another Western stooge.

A major geopolitical volcano is erupting. Ankara certainly has not analysed the blowback of weaponising Syrian Sunnis just for the weapons to find their way back into Turkey to be used by the PKK against Ankara itself.

This anti-imperialist analysis may be very useful to understand the Kurdish dynamic. But there's still much more to it.

Jeremy Salt, professor of History and Politics of the Middle East at Bilkent University, Ankara, and author of The Unmaking of the Middle East, in a conversation with La Stampa's world news editor Claudio Gallo, neatly summarised it:

"In 1918 the imperial powers divided the Middle East in a certain way that suited their interests at the time. They are now remapping it again - and again to suit their interests. It is not coincidental that this programme dovetails with Israel's own long-term strategic planning. Russia and China are fully aware of what is going on, which is why the present situation can be seen as a 21st century extension of the 'Eastern question' or of the 'Great Game' between Russia and Britain."

Make no mistake; each day makes it more likely that an unintended - or rather intended - consequence of this Great Game remix will be the emergence of Greater Kurdistan.

Pepe Escobar is the roving correspondent for Asia Times. His latest book is named Obama Does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009).

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

Source:Al Jazeera