Author: schoolmaster1954 » Wed Jan 10, 2007 5:36 am
October 27, 2006
Turkey's Kurdish Question and Northern Iraq
With further developments in Northern Iraq after the war, Kurdish question has become even more important for Turkey. However, upholding the French-inspired official ideology of Turkey makes the Kurdish issues a lot more difficult to solve. Thanks to the centralized and authoritarian educational system of Turkey, the influence of the official ideology is so vast that even academic papers cannot stay away from it.
Turks and Kurds lived together in peace for nine centuries under the Ottoman rule, during which no Muslims were regarded as minorities. The French-inspired 'unitary secular republican' rule, however, embraced nationalism, rejected multiculturalism, and demanded all minorities to conform to the 'official ideology,' which did not leave much room for either cultural differences or dissent.1
Although it was clearly stated by Turkish representatives2 in the Treaty of Lausanne that Kurds were not considered minorities, and that Anatolia was the homeland of both Kurds and Turks, this was hardly ever materialized. Kurds had lived within the Ottoman Empire enjoying a considerable degree of autonomy in the management of their affairs, however, the official ideology of the Turkish Republic 'has encouraged a blinkered approach where all Kurds are seen as separatists.'3
Today, the new republican elite's idea of the term 'nation-state' is defined in Turkey with the motto 'One realm, one nation, one flag, one language.' Although this ultra-nationalist tone strongly resembles the Hitler regime, it may be more to-the-point to quote the Italian nationalist leader Massimo d'Azeglio, who, during Risorgimento, is reported to have said, 'We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians.'
In order to 'make Turkish people,' the republican elite went as far as fabricating historic and linguistic theories, which focused on explaining how all civilizations and languages actually descended from Turks and the Turkish language.4 In this context, it was not difficult for the republican elite to assert that Kurds were, in fact, 'Mountain Turks,' who were not aware of their Turkish identity.5 In order to make the 'Mountain Turks' 'remember' their true language, the Kurdish language was banned, and government officials were sent to Eastern cities in an effort to teach Turkish to the Kurdish people – including the elderly. Those who were not able to learn the language were fined!6
Kurdish people are not short of stories of oppression. This is why the 'nation-building' process of the state must be thoroughly analyzed when the Kurdish issues are addressed. Turkish commentators, however, take the official ideology, and the role of the military in daily politics as a given. Since the military in Turkey also assumes the duty to protect the official ideology, such comments practically have nothing other than a deadlock to offer.
Some academicians claim, for example, that there is a major conflict between the 'state institutions' and the JDP over the conceptualization of the Kurdish issue and the foundations of the Turkish Republic.7 They draw their conclusions without considering the possibility that, regardless of what party is in power, the conflict will still be there unless the 'elected' party does not fully conform to the archaic ideology of the 'state institutions,' which is their euphemism for the Turkish Armed Forces.
Although it does not make any reasonable sense to those who defend individual rights, nationalists in Turkey constantly refer to the state's 'republican structure,' or 'special conditions,' and try to prove why some of the very rules of democracies should not apply to them. In the concluding remarks of his academic article on the Kurdish issue, Ersel Aydinli states that 'there are structural limits to Turkey's ability to address the Kurdish issue in a manner acceptable to the Europeans,' and that the 'Europeans should pay greater attention to Turkey's national security syndrome.'8 Although his first statement is completely true, the conclusion he reaches on this premise is simply not applicable. Because what Turkey needs to do is not to whine about its structure- and security-related problems but to try and understand 'why' it has them. But unfortunately, most of the 'appointed' government officials in Turkey, including the current President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, believe that more freedoms will bring more problems to the country, and keep denying that many of the problems the country faces today exist because of lack of freedoms.
Especially in the last 10 years, Turkish people increasingly question the legitimacy of various aspects of the official ideology. There is no reason not to believe that this trend is here to stay. Turkey, at this point, needs to go through another set of legal reforms, and make it very clear that its citizens are free to live their lives the way they see fit. This is necessary for assuring not only EU entry but also domestic peace. Because, more than 60% of the Kurds in Turkey now live west of Ankara – which makes separation not even 'technically' possible. Therefore, the only option left for Turkey is to go back to its roots and restore multiculturalism.
The Kurdish issue is obviously not only a Turkish politics phenomenon. Syria, Iraq and Iran have considerable amounts of Kurdish population. Since the 1990s, 'Turkey has repeatedly played the Iraqi Kurds off against its own rebellious Kurds, and supported one Iraqi Kurdish group against another.'9 But given the trend of the current political developments in the region, such policies are likely to prove useless in the long run. It is highly probable that a separate Kurdish state will eventually be born in Northern Iraq, and the Turkish Army will have to eat its words on its casus belli, or the so-called 'violation of its red-lines,' which do not allow a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. The question that needs to be asked at this point is: 'Why is Turkey still doing this when it is supposedly trying to join the EU?' Because, it is not only a Western but also an Ottoman value to respect the people's right to choose what is right for them. However, with every policy it follows, Turkey tries hard to be neither. It violates the rights of not only local Kurds but also those abroad, and then wonders why it still has security problems!
Every single day, thousands of people, legally or illegally, make their way into the United States. The reason why many of them they say, 'Thank God I've made it to America' right after, for example, swimming the Mexican river is that the U.S. is a center of attraction with every economic opportunity it provides. Northern Iraq, on the other hand, is a place that does not have much to offer to its people. It is incomparable even to Eastern Turkey, which is highly underdeveloped when compared to the West side. However, if some Kurds in Turkey still find the idea of an Iraqi Kurdistan highly appealing, then Turkey, looking at this mere fact, should finally realize that something is very wrong.
1 The rejection of the Ottoman multiculturalism by the new Turkish Republic can be depicted in Western terms as 'moving away from the Anglo-Saxon British model, and favoring the French one.'
2 Ismet Inonu, the second president of Turkey, who represented Turkey at the Treaty of Lausanne at the time is reported to have said, 'The Kurds and the Turks are the essential components of the Republic of Turkey. The Kurds are not a minority but a nation; the government in Ankara is the government of the Turks as well as of the Kurds.'
3 Fawcett, Louise. 2001. 'Down but not out? The Kurds in international politics.' Review of International Studies 27(1):109-118
4 Gunes Dil Teorisi (a.k.a. Sun Language Theory), developed by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, was focused on how all languages descended from Turkish. Turk Tarih Tezi, on the other hand, hypothesized that Turks belong to the white race, and the origin of the white race is Central Asia. Since Central Asia was also assumed to be the birth place of all civilizations, Turks should be regarded as the creators of most civilizations in the world today.
5 In an effort to portray the extent of the denial of Kurdish identity, Mustafa Akyol, in his book 'Kürt Sorununu Yeniden Düşünmek: Yanlış giden neydi, bundan sonra nereye?', quotes a book written in 1970: 'Eastern Cities and Varto History' by M. Serif Firat: "This book proves one more time that our citizens who reside in Eastern Anatolia and consider themselves non-Turk since they speak a language that is not similar to Turkish, and whom we also consider so due to our lack of knowledge, are pure Turks. Moreover, [this book does that with] scientific proofs that cannot possibly be denied. There is no race on earth with a separate identity that can be called 'Kurdish'... Eastern Turks who have been fooled by false propaganda, been deceived, and eventually gone astray must read this book, which will enlighten them, and must deeply contemplate."
6 Akyol, Mustafa. 2005. 'Kürt Sorununu Yeniden Düşünmek: Yanlış giden neydi, bundan sonra nereye?' Doğan Kitap.
7 Yavuz, M. Hakan; Özcan, Nihat Ali. 2006. “The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party.” Middle East Policy 13(1):102-119
8 Aydinli, Ersela. 2002. 'Between Security and Liberalization: Decoding Turkey's Struggle with the PKK.' Security Dialogue 33(2):209-225
9 Gunter, Michael M. 2004. 'Kurds in Iraq.' Middle East Policy 11(1):106-131
Posted by Serdar Kaya on October 27, 2006 3:02 PM | Link