Kurdistan independence related articles & photos

[Rando]

Will something happen this year ?? Whit do you belive?

i believe it will happen either this year (berzani said he would hold a referendum to take our own way in september this year if iraq keeps on going into a dictatorship) or next year (when the pipeline to turkey will be finished)

But if South Kurdistan will be independent other parts can't become independent anymore right?

i am pretty sure they can. if we look at syria now,it is on a verge of a break up. W.kurdistan will either get atounemy or indepednece. turkey tries to make W.kurdistan a part of turkey,while KRG tries to make it part of KRG (you can read it on a topic talsor posted some days ago).
for E.kurdistan,if iranian air power is destroyed by NATO,im pretty sure E. kurdistan can get atounemy like S.k did,and send those muallah soldiers out of kurdistan.
it is even better if NATO invades iran,then they will destroy both the army and air force. but i fear many religous kurds will go to war with NATO.
im also concerend about N.K. im not sure how it will get independence.
i don`t think even 0.1% of kurds would want S.k To become independent if we lost the other parts,not even south kurds (including me).

[zaxo10]

Are they bulding the pipeline to Turkey right now??

[alan131210]

Are they bulding the pipeline to Turkey right now??

yes will finish Aug next year

[alan131210]

Khairallah: Kurdish state will be established and Kurds know how to benefit from their experiences

05/07/2012

AMSTERDAM, July 5 (AKnews) - Lebanese writer and journalist Khairallah Khairallah said that the Kurdish state will be established and that the Kurdish people know how to benefit from their experiences, adding that this shows political maturity and a desire to adopt realism instead of slogans.

Khairallah said in the interview with AKnews that the dispute between Baghdad and Erbil is under control where the ruling party in Baghdad knows that it cannot go far in its demands because it is aware that it cannot be a part of open confrontation with the Kurdistan Region. On the other hand, the region will benefit from this case to reach extensive decentralization, closer to undeclared independence.

What do you think about the relationship between the government of Baghdad and that of the Kurdistan Region? Are there any fears of a war caused by the differences about the disputed territories and the sharing of oil wealth?

The relationship between the two governments is the relation of interest and the federal government recognizes the limits of its influence and the Kurdistan Regional Government recognizes that it must build the future of Kurdistan without raising a lot of sensitivities. From this standpoint, it seems that the differences between the two sides are under control. The time factor is in the favor of the Kurds so why would they create problems and participate in political confrontations that have no future? What is the point of that?

What is your assessment of the democratic experiment in Iraq?

The democratic experiment in Iraq is at its beginnings. It's like a crawling baby. Will the day come for this experience to be able to stand up? There is hope but it is very little for a very simple reason, that is the experience of democracy cannot succeed in the presence of religious parties that have militias of their own. Unfortunately the Iraqi society is in a state of decline at all levels. The Baathist family system established by the Saddam Hussein's regime affected deeply the Iraqi society. The social problem is currently the biggest problem that has plagued Iraq if we exclude the Kurdish regions, which knew how to keep themselves away from religious and sectarian strife that Iraq suffered from.

Iraqi-Arab relations are still tense. How can they be improved?

Nothing is clear in the whole region so how would it be in a very complex issue like Iraqi-Arab relations? Arab-Iraqi relations are normal. This is due to several factors, notably Sunni-Shia interactions in Iraq and abroad and Iranian influence in this country. We can say that Iran is the primary beneficiary of the US invasion of Iraq, it is the only victor in this war. Was the victory of Iran against the Iraqi people? Can it be considered a victory?

Iraq currently lacks balance and identity under the influence of Iran, and the Arabs are lost and can only see the Iranian danger that threatens them. Arabs have the right to exaggerate about the Iranian threat, given that Iran is using the sectarian weapon in its attempt to destabilize the security of certain Arab countries, especially in the Gulf region. At the end of the fall of Bahrain under the Iranian influence threatened Saudi security directly and this is what cannot be accepted by the kingdom or nearby countries. It's an issue of life or death for Saudi Arabia and Gulf Arab states.

In addition, there is still a need for a long period of time for Arabs to understand exactly what is going on in Iraq and for Iraqis to recognize the ways that must be adopted to improve the relationship with other Arabs rather than the Baghdad government implementing the instructions of the Iranian authorities.

There is an Iranian influence on the course of events in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and at the same time some are seeking to ignore this influence rather than interacting with it. What is the right way, in your opinion, to deal with it in the best interests of Arabs?

There is no doubt that the Iranian influence is based in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Without Iraq there would have been no government led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq and the Baathist regime would have fallen in Syria a long time ago. As for Beirut, it is under Iranian occupation. This is applied to several Lebanese areas that turned into security islands controlled by Hezbollah, which the Lebanese consider to be part of Iran's Revolutionary Guards.

The Arabs, unfortunately, have only one option which is confrontation with Iran. This confrontation begins with steadfastness and revealing the truth of the Iranian project. If Iran had accepted negotiation and openness with Arabs it wouldn't have kept the occupation of three UAE islands since 1971. Is there a nice occupation of the Arab land because it is an Iranian occupation and a hateful one that is the Israeli occupation?

How do you see the future of events in Syria?

The regime in Syria is over. Is it normal that one family that belongs to a small community governs for over four decades, under the "resistance" and "objection" slogans? The question is how will the end of the regime come about? There are fears that the longer the crisis continues, the more division may occur in the country. The problem of Syria since its independence is the problem of entity and it turned into a problem of regime and entity at the same time. The development of events are heading towards the deterioration of the Syrian entity.

You wrote "when it comes to oil and oil reserves and the future of an important region of the world such as the Gulf region, Iran must take its natural size". Is this happening or is Iran expanding its influence?

It is apparent that the Iranian regime learned nothing from the experiences of others, including the experience of Saddam Hussein in 1990 who occupied Kuwait without being aware of the results of occupying an oil country.

The Gulf region is an important area for the whole world and Iran cannot control the wealth of the region and that of Iraq. Iran is not a superpower, it doesn't have the superpower elements. It lives on the revenues of oil and doesn't have alternatives to oil. When the Iranian regime plays its required role in the field of intimidating the Gulf states and forcing it to buy large quantities of weapons, the major countries, mainly the United States, will take the necessary measures to return Iran to its normal size.

Do you see the features of a Kurdish state in the future? And when can it be achieved?

The Kurdish state will be established. Only the Kurds do not want to recognize it in these days. The Kurds are people who know how to benefit from their experiences. The Kurdish citizens do not need slogans, they need work, education and bread first.

Some believe that the region is on the verge of a Sunni-Shiite conflict, an alternative to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The two main players are Sunni Turkey and Shiite Iran. What do you think about this?

Anything can happen in the region. There is a Sunni-Shiite conflict dominating now and all that has to do with the Palestinian issue. Arabs lie when they say that Palestine is still their first case. Palestine is still the issue of the Palestinians alone and this reality cannot be ignored. But the question remains - what is the future of Iran? When will the presence of its regime end?

As for Turkey, I do not think it will participate in a Shiite-Sunni conflict with Iran. The Turks are much more aware and know the weaknesses and strengths of the Iranian regime and prefer to avoid direct confrontation with it, at least in the present time.

[Cewlik]

Alan you posted the wrong picture, its not Karayilan from the PKK who say that its the Lebanese writer and journalist Khairallah Khairallah.

[alan131210]

Lol I got mixed with Kayrakan statement which he said "we might join with SK and proclaim a kurdish state"

[alan131210]

Hoshyar Zebari, iraqi foreign minister announced, Kurds have the right for statehood and he would be honoured to hold a ministry in such a state.

In an interview with (Le Monde) daily news he announced, "Kurdish people have the right to establish their own state, and I hope that kurds hurry up and declare their own state".

He also pointed out, even though he is a minister for an Arabic country, but on the same time he works for kurdish cause, and his work does not mix with his ministerial duties, and that he is ready to hold a ministry post within a kurdish state.

The iraqi FM also announced "At the moment Kurds have the ability to separate from iraq, but the international pressure has been an obstacle".

http://www.xebat.net/detail_articals.ph ... 26&z=2&l=1

[hevalo27]

and I hope that kurds hurry up and declare their own state"....
...The iraqi FM also announced "At the moment Kurds have the ability to separate from iraq,.

nice, i will kiss his hands if i see him one day personally
we need more politicans who encourage us to seperate. only we must decide wheter we dare this move or not.

but the international pressure has been an obstacle".

the international pressure will always be a obstacle. within the next 2-3 years is our once chance, otherwise we could barter away our unique chance for independence.
i hope serok barzani will make the survey in september and the kurds decide again for independence.

[alan131210]

By Harold Rhode - Gatestone Institute

If one views Assad in this context, there is a real possibility that Syria will not stay united, and that the days of Arab nationalism are over. Islamist Sunni fundamentalism is the enemy of the non-Sunnis, who, to survive, will likely have to look for other political alternatives beyond the present borders, and possibly ally themselves with fellow non-Sunni Arabs in the region.

Similarly, the Kurds in northern Syria, who are directly connected to the Kurdish territories inside Iraq, although also Sunni, see the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wahhabis by and large as Arab imperialists trying to force them to abandon their Kurdish identity and become Arabs -- probably the reason most Kurds loathe the Muslim Brotherhood. For the Brotherhood, being Sunni is not enough. For the Brotherhood, only Arabs can be true Muslims. Non-Arabs must abandon their non-Arab and non-Sunni languages and cultures, and adopt an Arab identity -- exactly how most of the Middle East became Arabs during the first century of Islam.

If the present violence in Syria does not come to an end, Syria could easily disintegrate; the northern part of the country would become a Kurdish entity – either within a loosely federated, geographically altered Syria, or possibly even as an independent state. If either of these were to happen, Iraqi Kurds, who have been politically counseling the Syrian Kurds, could form an alliance with Syria's Kurds who inhabit an area which reaches west almost to Aleppo, a city not far from the Mediterranean Sea. If the Kurds then made some political arrangement/alliance with a future Alawite state, they could gain access to the sea . This would be a major step towards the establishment of an independent Kurdish state.

In short, what stands behind most of the violence in Syria is the rise of Arab Sunni fundamentalism in its various forms – whether Salafi, Wahhabi, or Muslim Brotherhood. All of those threaten the very existence of the Alawites, the Kurds, and other members of the non-Sunni ethnic and religious groups.

It is therefore much easier to understand why the ruling Alawites feel they are fighting a life and death battle with the Sunnis, and why they believe they must spare no effort to survive. It also explains why most of Syria's other minorities – such as the Druze, Ismailis, and Christians – still largely support the Assad regime.

Copyright ©, respective author or news agency, gatestoneinstitute.org

[hevalo27]

Interesting, this could really be the last option for assad to safe the alawites against the rebels.
A win-win situation for both, kurds and alawites.

The question is will assad accept it or will he be stupid and risk the rule of the sunnis. fact is, the alawites will allways be supressed, if he loose the civil war.
a massacre to minotirties is sure, so maybe we will see the realization of this idea. a broken syria with 3 zones, kurdisch, alawite-arabic and sunni-arabic.

[alan131210]

its the only solution whether they like it or not, the author is added .

[jjmuneer]

splitting iraq: how likely is an independent kurdistan?

The disputes between Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan have led some local politicians to call for the semi-autonomous region to secede from Iraq and become its own country. But, as one Kurdish commentator argues, this is far from realistic. Because now it’s all about money and oil, not politics.



Recently there has been a lot of comment about an independent Iraqi Kurdistan. As tensions between Baghdad and the semi-autonomous, northern state of Iraqi Kurdistan continue, the Kurdish have been playing the “independence card”, with local politicians and commentators airing their views on the subject like never before.



It is no secret that the majority of Kurds, if not in fact, all of them, would love to see an independent Kurdistan. And the easiest way for a Kurdish politician to become popular is to call for an independent state.



Although the Kurdish president, Massoud Barzani, has recently given the impression that he wants to see an independent Iraqi Kurdistan, the political party to which he belongs, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), and the other major political party in the area, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have so far resisted similar temptations. In fact, most Kurdish politicians are still talking about a “united Iraq” despite Kurdish public opinion against this idea.



And they have a point. If you are a Kurdish politician and you need to maintain diplomatic relations with your neighbours, and if you’re aware of the economic and political realities for Iraqi Kurdistan, then it’s very hard to call for Kurdish independence and really mean it.



It is possible that Iraqi Kurdistan is politically mature enough to be independent – but the region is not ready for such a step in economic or military terms. And it is true that, over time, the political consequences of Kurdish independence have always been considered greater than the economic consequences. But that no longer applies.



A clear example is the Kurdish rebellion against former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s regime in the early 1970s. When Hussein started to become friendly with the Soviet Union, then-US President Richard Nixon began to fund, and encourage, the Kurdish to fight for their independence against Hussein, as part of a strategy to weaken Hussein’s regime and general policy against the USSR. But just as the Kurdish revolutionaries seemed to be succeeding, it became clear that none of the parties supporting the Kurds actually wanted them to win their independence – the ploy was purely political – and support was withdrawn.



Additionally the question of Kurdish independence has always troubled the surrounding countries; none of them have ever wanted a Kurdish State.



But now, given Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil and gas potential and the benefits that could bring surrounding countries in terms of trade, those neighbours have softened their stand on Kurdish independence – and they’re likely to soften even further as trade ties develop.



There are also strong economic overtones to Baghdad’s policy toward Kurdish independence. Baghdad sees the various disputes over revenue sharing, oil contracts and oil exports currently going on between Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan as necessary to its centralist agenda. Partially, it is about deterring other Iraqi regions, some of which have suggested the idea, from asking for independence to become a region with autonomy similar to that enjoyed by Iraqi Kurdistan.



Although, given the advanced stage of the oil industry in the Kurdistan region, Baghdad realises that their disputes with Iraqi Kurdistan are unlikely to end in their favour, they still have to send out a clear, centralist-flavoured message. Imagine, for example, if a province like Basra - which currently has most of the Iraqi oil reserves and which has the only access to ocean-going transport – achieved the same kind of independence Iraqi Kurdistan had. Given its strategic position, it might eventually become as powerful as the central government.



Even for the Kurdish themselves, the main question about an independent Kurdistan comes down to economics.



Up until now the economics of independence have always been an afterthought; even the Kurds have subconsciously ignored them. However in modern times, if the petro-dollars from Baghdad stopped flowing and people started to feel the pinch in their pockets, the idea of independence might not look so romantic after all.



This is the reality: Iraqi Kurdistan is land locked; it is dependent upon selling its own natural resources and importing consumables in exchange. Having bad, or no, relations with neighbouring countries is simply not an option for Iraqi Kurdistan.



And Iraqi Kurdistan has been operating like a state within a state, but without the duties of a state.



The Iraqis have continued to send 17 percent of the Iraqi federal budget to the Kurdish (although it was delayed this year). Most of the Iraqi federal budget is generated by oil revenues and currently, most of Iraq’s oil is produced in southern Iraq, in places like Basra. Any northern oil tends to come from the disputed Kirkuk region.



Iraq's oil production is rising, set to reach over 3.4 million barrels per day by the end of the year according to former Iraqi Oil Minister Thamir Ghadhban, also Chairman of Advisory Commission to Iraqi Prime Minister.





And with this, the federal budget is also swelling – so is Iraqi Kurdistan’s 17 percent share. However due to disagreements over oil policy, revenue sharing and Baghdad’s refusal to pay oil company costs, Iraqi Kurdistan is pursuing its own oil production agenda.



However in Iraqi Kurdistan, this sector is still largely underdeveloped. And, due to this and aforementioned disputes, the state is not contributing as much as it can to Iraq's oil exports. Which is why many Iraqi politicians have already argued that the Kurdish are getting an unfairly large share of the country’s income even while they’re not contributing as much.



The most obvious move for the Kurdish would be to annex the disputed area of Kirkuk, where much of the northern oil is currently being produced, and get full use of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast.



The northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk has actually been one of the flash points of the struggle between the Iraqis and the Kurdish over the past few decades. During former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s regime, the Kurdish population was driven out of Kirkuk so that Arab Iraqis could control the oil rich area. Today Kirkuk remains largely Kurdish and the government of Iraqi Kurdistan claims it belongs to them. Although legally it belongs to Baghdad, currently the city is, in fact, under the de-facto control of the Kurdish government.



Even in the unlikely scenario that such an annexation happens, in the short term Iraqi Kurdistan would still struggle to generate as much income as Baghdad sends them. Putting the required infrastructure into place would take time and would need the consent of neighbouring countries, like Turkey.



The economic consequences of losing the over US$11 billion that the Kurdish receive from Iraq would be devastating for the region; the whole economy could implode, which in turn would lead to many political and social problems.



Iraqi Kurdistan has other income streams and income opportunities and the promise of a hydrocarbon pipeline to Turkey offers a life line but in the short term, this income will not be enough to pay salaries in the bloated public sector or to invest in rebuilding the infrastructure, that would eventually lead to growth and an increase in oil and gas production.



In fact it’s disputable whether Kurdish oil production could ever match Baghdad’s current contribution. If Kirkuk and other disputed territories are taken out of the equation, then the amount of oil Iraqi Kurdistan could export may never match up to the 17 percent of the budget that they’re currently getting.



So although many Kurds yearn for independence, when the state’s finances dry up and there are budget cuts, unemployment and a reduction in living standards, those views may well change – and, whatever other faults they may have, almost all Kurdish politicians can see this how this would be extremely unpopular.



An independent Iraqi Kurdistan would not just lose its Baghdad budget, the state would also go from holding some part of the balance of power in the Iraqi parliament – the Kurdish bloc has been referred to as “kingmakers” because the two major opposition blocs have fairly equal numbers in Parliament – to being a small state, surrounded by far larger, far less friendly states in the area.



Should Iraqi Kurdistan secede, it is not even clear whether the international community would recognise the would-be country as a fully fledged nation-state.



In international terms, Kurdish independence would rely heavily on the Iraqi Kurdish relationship with Turkey. In fact, contrary to popular opinion in both Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, an independent Kurdistan could benefit Turkey immensely.



Despite historical antipathies (Turkey is still fighting a battle against the Kurdish population within its own borders), Turkey is the most likely nation to support the idea simply because then they would have greater influence over Iraqi Kurdistan – and Iraqi Kurdistan has the potential to become a future, cheap energy source fuelling the booming Turkish economy.



In conclusion, if it comes to a referendum on independence – something that President Barzani has suggested during ongoing disputes with Baghdad – Kurdish politicians would be caught between a rock and a hard place.



On one hand, if they advocate independence, they face not only economic hardship but also regional isolation, a loss of influence in Iraq and increased dependence on the goodwill of both Turkey and Iran.



On the other hand, if they stay part of Iraq, then they must help to build the nation for real and find solutions to outstanding, contentious issues – such as the oil exports and the disputed territories like Kirkuk and Mosul.



Should they decide upon the latter for the time being– and this seems most likely and most sensible option– then Kurdistan can become more of an assertive regional player. Eventually this would give the region a better bargaining power when the statehood, that so many Kurdish long for has more potential to become a reality.

http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=3087

[alan131210]

no thanks bye bye iraq and we will do it our way like we have been since 1991, and put an end to the omen of been called "iraqi".

and when Kurdistan has its own independent oil route the 17% will be nothing compare to what Kurdistan will get, it will get 100% of its oil exports, so far it is 300,000 capacity with the pipeline finished it will be 1 mill per day thus bypassing the so called 17% which is really 10% as iraq steals Peshemrga budget every year.

[Kurdistano]

http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=3087

An Iraqi paper, seriously?

Not that it matter but they use old arguments which most of them are already cleared. Its not like 2-3 Years ago when we had to fear a war on us from all sides of our neighbors. yet Turkey almost officially accepted the idea of independent Kurdistan, They are building a Pipeline which will automatically lead to independence. Iran has its own Problem, Syria is screwed.
The paper is simply presenting their chauvinist Arab wishful thinking of a "unified " and "under Arab rule" Iraq.

And that Maliki wants to cut the Budget, this is also not mention. I dont know how you even could came up with such a shitty article heval JJmuneer.

[zaxo10]

what will countries like turkey, iran, russia and china to say??